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Frameworks for Analyzing the Effects of Risk and
Environmental Regulations on Productivity
By W. KiP VIsCusI*
Although regulatory agencies have promulgated health, safety, and environmental
regulations largely on the basis of their presumed benefits, the adverse economic effects
of these policies are becoming an increasingly prominent concern. A series of studies
has linked these regulations to the productivity slowdown, inflation, and unemployment.'
Significant economic effects of this type
should be expected since the present value of
the costs associated with major risk and environmental regulations proposed between
1975 and 1980 was $332.2-$846.5 billion.2
These cost impacts are both quite large and
highly variable. My concern in this paper is
with how both the level of these costs and
their uncertainty affect productivity.3
The existence of a negative relationship
between the regulatory burden and capital
investments, and consequently productivity,
is not controversial. A conventional model of
this type is developed in Section I. If, however, these regulations change over time and
firms' investment decisions are irreversible,
there will be additional distortions, as shown
in Section II. In Section III, I show that
uncertainty regarding these regulatory
changes exacerbates the adverse productivity
effects even for risk-neutral firms.

*Professorand Director,Centerfor Study of Business Regulation,FuquaSchool of Business,Duke University, Durham, NC 27706. This researchwas supported in part by the Center for Study of Business
Regulation.
'These studies include Edward Denison (1978),
Robert Haveman and Gregory Christainsen(1980)
Marvin Kosters (1980), Paul MacAvoy (1979), Peter
Pashigian(1981),and Paul Portney(1980).
21 presentthis estimatein my 1983study.
3The role of regulatoryuncertaintyis often stressed
by businessmen.As GeorgeP. Shultzobserved,it introduces "a real wild cardin investmentdecisions"(1980,
p. 14).
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I. Regulatory Impacts with Reversible
Investments

If firms' investments are completely reversible, we can treat the firm as if it were
renting capital on a period-by-period basis.
This can be done using either a single period
model, or, in a multiperiod context, by assuming that the firm is myopic. In this section, I develop a fairly conventional model of
this type to establish a point of reference for
the subsequent results. Consider firms with
two choice variables, the output level q and
the quality level z, which will be scaled
without loss of generality so that z is in the
interval [0, 1], where higher values of z represent higher quality levels. For risk regulations, the value of 1 - z represents the risk
level per unit of output, such as the product
failure probability or the injury rate per
worker.4 For environmental situations, 1 - z
can be viewed as the level of pollution per
unit of output.
The firm sells its output at a price v, and
incurs production costs C(q), where C(q) >
0, C'> 0, and C"> 0. Raising the quality
level z is also costly, with the unit cost of
producing quality z being given by G(z),
where G(z) > 0, G'> 0, and G" > 0. Finally,
firms are penalized x per unit of risk or
pollution, so that the overall regulatory
penalty is xq(l - z). The value of x represents the total quality-related penalty, including rewards transmitted through market
forces, but for concreteness I will treat the
entire value of x as a policy parameter. If x
reflects the value society places on each unit
of quality, the regulatory policy will lead to
an efficient outcome. The financial incentives imposed by workers' compensation sys4In the case of job safety, one can easily modify the
formulation below so that the firm picks the number of
workers L rather than the output level q.
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tems or by proposed pollution tax policies
best fit this structure. The model is also
applicable to standards policies for which the
penalties are linked to the extent of noncomplicance once we reinterpret z as the degree
of regulatory compliance.5
Firms consequently select the level of q
and z to maximize profits a o, or they
(1)
Max7T0= vq - C(q)-qG(z)-xq(l

- z),

q, z

yielding first-order conditions that reduce to6
(2)

C'=v-G(z)-x(l-z);

(3)

G'= x.

For given quality level z, the regulation
lowers the marginal benefits of production
(or raises the marginal costs if one rearranges
equation (2)), lowering the optimal output
level. As equation (3) implies, the optimal
quality level is set where its unit cost equals
the regulatory penalty x. Finally, more stringent regulatory penalties will raise the overall
quality level and depress output, as

az/ax = l/G" > 0
aq/ax= -(l-z)/C"<0.

and

II. IrreversibleDecisionsandChanges
in RegulatoryPolicies
If there are no impediments to changes in
the firm's decisions, shifts in regulatory
policies can be assessed using a one-period
model as in Section I. Firms usually have
much more limited discretion. Modifications
in plant capacity, particularly in the downward direction, are typically quite costly due
5The only additional complication is that corner
solutions play a more important role in the case of
standards. For firms that choose complete compliance,
the penalty term involving z drops out of the analysis,
but the unit cost terms remain, where an optimizing firm
will set z at the minimal level to ensure compliance in
this instance.
6The second-order conditions are also satisfied since
0T? <

?0

qTs

<

0,

and

0

?7qT7?_(qTO72

G
= qCG>

O.
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to the specialized nature of the capital stock,
transactions costs involved in its resale, and
the absence of a strong resale market. Similarly, once a firm has complied with risk and
environmental regulations by, for example,
installing a ventilation system to control
hazardous fumes, the costs of compliance
represent a sunk cost that cannot be readily
recovered.
Although the degree of inflexibility spans
a continuum of possibilities, both in the upward and downward directions, I will focus
on irreversibilities, where there is complete
downward inflexibility in the enterprise's decision. Under this formulation, which was
introduced by Kenneth Arrow (1968), the
firm cannot reduce past capital investments,
but it is free to augment these investments.
This asymmetric approach is intended to be
an approximation to the greater difficulties
associated with decreasing past investments.
While these investments may not be characterized by complete downward inflexibility, as the transactions costs of disinvestment
increase, the results approach those under
strict irreversibility.
Consider firms making decisions in a twoperiod model. Since in a single period, C(q)
and G(z) represented the capital stock rental
costs for one period, I will treat the role of
irreversibility as making the first-period
choice of q and z tantamount to a rental
commitment that it cannot reduce.7 If we
denote the two periods by subscripts i, where
i = 1,2, the irreversibility assumption is that
q2 ? q1 and Z2 > Zl Once an enterpriseselects an output or quality level, it cannot reduce it.
A. Increasing Regulatory Stringency
Suppose that firms are aware that the
regulatory penalty will rise from x in period
1 to x* in period 2, where x* > x. Regulatory
policies that are phased in over several years
have this character, as policymakers attempt
7In a two-period model, this approach gives much
more realistic results than examining actual capital investments since investments in the first period will have
a longer useful life. In addition, as in the case of Arrow's
analysis (p. 5), I will abstract from the influence of
depreciation since it plays no essential role.
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to ease the adjustmentburdens on the affected industries. Increasingthe regulatory
penalty will enhance the attractivenessof
quality investments and will diminish the
incentive to make capacity investmentsby
raising the regulatoryburden per unit of
output. Since the firm cannot reduceits output level, it will remain at whateverlevel is
selectedin period 1, or

leading to first-orderconditions that can be
rewrittenas

(4)

As regulationsbecomemore stringent,ideally firms would like to expand their quality
investment and diminish their capacity investment.The increasein the quality investment is feasible,as firmsselectzi on a myopic
basis in each period (equations(5) and (6))
based on the regulatorypenalty and marginal investment costs. These quality investments are independentof the output level so
that the first-orderconditionsare not mutually dependent;the zi values affect capacity,
but there is no reverselinkage. Since capacity investmentscannot be diminished,there
is no additionalinvestmentin period 2, and
the capacitylevel for both periodsis selected
in period 1 to satisfy equation(7).
The fundamentalconcernhere is how the
resultingcapacityinvestmentlevels compare
with those under the reversiblecases. Because of the recursivenature of the results
(i.e., the zi influenceq1 but are not affected
by it), this relationshiphinges only on the
capacity investment first-order conditions.
The condition that the terms on the right
side of equation(2) exceed the right side of
equation(7) reducesto

q2 =

qI

An optimizingfirm will, however,raise z in
the secondperiod.The cost functionsremain
the same as before, but I will sometimesuse
the notation Gi to denote G(zi), and similarly C1for C(qi).

I will follow the usual dynamic programmingapproachof consideringthe decisions in the second period, given the firstperiod choices, and then work backwardsto
analyzethe optimal first-periodchoices. The
value of z2 is picked to maximizethe profits
I* in the second period,or
Max7T*= vql

-

Z2
-

C(ql)

q,G(z2)-x*ql(l-Z2)

yielding
(5)

G2

x

This equation, which is the second-period
analogueof equation(3), indicatesthe optimal z2 level as a functionof x*. Equation(5)
thus implicitly defines a function Z(x*),
which gives the optimal value of z2 as a
function of x*, where Z'> 0. It is noteworthy that z2 depends only on x* and not
on any other parametersor on any decisions
in period 1. The optimal decisionsin period
2 are definedby equations(4) and (5).
The task in period 1 is to maximizedis-

(6)

GI = x;

(7)

Cl = v
Gl + x(l-zl)+f8G2

+ /x*(l-Z)

1+13

G(z(x))+

x(I

< G (Z(x*

-

z(x))
x*l

-

Z(x*))

H,

count factor /3 is the inverseof one plus the
interest rate. The values of qI and zI are
selectedto

or showingthat the quality-relatedcosts per
unit of output are greater in situations in
whichx is increasedto x* thanin one-period
problems.To prove that H is increasingin x
differentiate and apply the envelope theorem, yielding

Max'

(8)

counted expected profits IT, where the dis-

ql, z,

,

D

=

vq1-C(ql)-q,G(zl)-xql(1

rvq - C(l) qX

()

-

l Z
x*ql -.

zl)

dH/dx* = 1-Z > O.

The prospectof tighterregulationsdepresses
the value of ql, comparedwith the reversible

case, as the expression on the right-hand side
of equation (2) always exceeds the comparable terms in equation (7).8
Upon total differentiation of equations (6)
and (7), it can be shown that
aZI1/a8 = aZI/aX* = 0,

aql/a,8 < O, and aql/ax* < O.
The policy shift in period 2 does not alter zI,
but it does depress the optimal output level.
An enterprise facing a schedule of increasingly stringent regulations will reduce its initial output level and be myopic in its quality
investments. Increasing the discount factor
places a greater weight on these secondperiod choices, leading to a reduction in the
output level.
B. Decreasing RegulatoryStringency
When regulations are loosened rather than
tightened, there are many similarities in the
technical aspects of the analysis, but some
significant differences in the nature of the
results. If the penalty falls from x to x * in
period 2, where x > x*, the firm cannot reduce z, so that z2 = Z1, but it can increase its
output level. It will do this in period 2 to

maximizesecond-periodprofitsST*, or
Max7T*= vq2 - C(q2)-

q2G(zl)

q2

-

x*q2(1

-Z)

yielding
(9)
q2
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C2= v- GI -x*(l

-zl).

Equation (9) implictly defines the optimal
as a function of x * and z1, where
aq2/ax*

and

aq2/aZI=

< 0;

(x*-G')/C2

<0.

This relationship will be denoted by
Q(x*, zl). The effect of z1 on q2 involves two
8This result also implies that in the case of corner
solutions in which the quality level is 1, there will be no
effect of more stringent regulations on either the output
or quality level since I - z equals zero once quality hits
the maximum level.

competing effects. I will show below that the
marginal penalty x* per unit of quality is
smaller than the increased unit cost of quality G' at the optimal zl. This gap arises since
the firm will overinvest in zI in period 1
relative to the quality investment it would
have chosen if the penalty were always x .
As a result, the high quality investment commitment from period 1 depresses output in
period 2 since the marginal costs imposed by
z1 exceed the marginal reduction in regulatory penalties in period 2.
The decision in period 1 is to
MaxT**
ql,z,

=

vql

zl)

- C(qj)-qIG(zl)-xql(-

+ ,8 [vQ

-

C(Q)-

QG(zl)-

x*Q(1

-

zj)],

leading to the first-order conditions
(10)

7qr**=0=v-C

(11)

7Tz**

= 0 =-qjG'

+/3Q(x*-

l-GI-x(I-zl);
+ xql

G).

Equation (10) is equivalent to the results for
the myopic case in equation (2), for fixed
values of quality zI. Comparing equations (9)
and (10), it is clear that as the regulatory
penalty is loosened from x to x *, the incentive to expand output in period 2 is increased
since the only terms that change will be the
choice variable q2 (through C2) and the regulatory penalty per unit of output, which falls
from x(I - zl) to x*(I - z1).
Rewriting equation (11) in terms of the
marginal investment cost yields
(12)

G' = (xqI +jfx*Q)/(qI

+j8Q) <x,

since x * < x. Compared to the myopic quality choice in equation (3), the firm always
underinvests in quality if the regulation will
be loosened. This effect arises from a desire
to prevent having overinvested in quality
from the standpoint of the second period's
regulatory policy in a situation in which investment decisions are irreversible.
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Assuming the second-order conditions are
fulfilled,9 the effect of a relaxation of the
regulatory policy can be summarized as follows:

dx>

'

a

'?;

d

'?;

a

Higher values of 13,which reflect a greater
weight on second-period decisions, depress
both forms of investment. The x * results
differ from those for situations of increasing
regulatory stringency since the second-period
penalty affects z1 as well as ql. This difference arises because the firm no longer
chooses z1 myopically but must make a permanent quality investment commitment in
period 1. This commitment is dependent on
the penalty levels and capacity choices in
both periods. Increases in the second-period
x * boost the quality commitment z1. Unlike
the situation of increasing regulatory stringency, there is no direct effect of x * on q,
since the irreversibility contraint on capacity
investments is not binding, as the firm will
increase its output in period 2. Since z1 affects ql, however, there is an indirect effect
of x * on q1. The higher zI values induced by
increases in x* reduce the marginal regulatory penalties on output, so that increases in
x * also enhance the incentives for capacity
investments.
The parallels with the situation of increasing regulatory stringency are clearer if one
views these policies in terms of departures
from the initial policy x. The more x * is
lowered below the initial penalty level, the
more both q1 and z1 will be depressed. Similarly, the more x* exceeds x, the greater will
be the reduction in ql. All shifts in regulatory policy depress the initial output level. In
the case of increasingly stringent regulations,
it is because firms underinvest to avoid an
irreversible commitment to a level of production that will subsequently be inefficiently
large; in the case of regulations being relaxed
it is the feedback effect of reduced quality
investments that diminishes output. In9This requirement is that C'[Gj'ql -fBQ.(x *-G' )
- x)2> 0, where Qz, = (x*G')/C2'.

+,#G"'Q]-(G'
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creasing the weight 18 on the second-period
decisions always reduces both q1 and z, when
there is a shift in regulatory policies.
One might have expected that a known
regulatory policy change would have influenced only one of the two forms of irreversible investment since a change in x will
only make one of the first-period irreversibility constraints binding. The actual impact is
more pervasive due to the interdependence
of the two types of investment when regulations are being relaxed.
III. UncertainRegulatoryPolicies
While industries occasionally face a known
schedule of regulatory changes, particularly
when very stringent regulations are being
phased in gradually, future shifts in the regulatory policy are usually not specified in
advance. This uncertainty is particularly great
for regulations of hazards for which the
available medical evidence is imprecise. The
uncertainty regarding policy shifts, for any
particular set of information, compounds
these scientific uncertainties. If one assumes
that firms are risk neutral, one might expect
that the role of uncertainty could be treated
using the results of Section II. After calculating the expected penalty J- in period 2 and
noting whether or not it involved a decrease
or an increase in regulatory stringency, one
might then apply the pertinent model for
known regulatory changes. As the subsequent results will indicate, such a relationship does not hold, as regulatory uncertainties introduce new complications into the
firm's decisions and the policy design process.
A. Implicationsfor Firms' Decisions
Suppose the firm is facing a binary policy
lottery in period 2, where the penalty may
rise to x* or fall to x*, where x* > x > x*.
The situation in which one of the secondperiod penalties equals x poses no additional
complications for the analysis below, but for
concreteness I will assume that the strict
inequalities hold. If both x* and x * equalled
x, the analysis would be the same as in
Section II. The firm assesses the probability

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
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that x* will be the penalty as p and the
probability that x* will be the penalty as
(1 - p), and based on these expectations it is
assumed to maximize discounted expected
profits vT.10
The decision in period 2 parallels the results for the situation of certain policy
changes. If x rises to x*, there will be no
change in the output level since the firm
cannot reduce output below its first-period
level. The firm will, however, raise its quality
investment Z2, which is given by Z(x*) and
is defined by equation (5) as before. Similarly, reductions in x to x * lead the firm to
make no change in its quality investment but
provide an incentive to raise output to
Q(x *, z1), which is implicitly defined by
equation (9). From the standpoint of the
second-period decisions, the uncertainty only
affects q2 indirectly through its effect on z1.
problem for the
The first-period
profit-maximizing firm is a variant on the
earlier problems for the certainty case since
the firm will
Max7T= vql
ql,

-

)-xql

C(qj)-qqG(zI

(-

zl)

z,

+ [p [vql

C(qj )- qIG(Z)-

-

+ (1-p)[vQ

-

C(Q)-

Z)]

x*ql (-

QG(zl)
- X*Q(l- Z)],

producing the first-order conditions

(13)

?Tq =O=v

-Cj--GI-x(l-zl)

+ 13p[v
(14)

rz = 0 =-qG

- C-

G-

x*(l

-

Z)];

+ xql

+ (1l- p)[Q(-

G' + x*)] .

These conditions can be rewritten as
(15)

C= v
+fpx*(l-Z)
GI + x(l-zl)+f3pG2
I+ Rn

'0The introduction of risk aversion would reinforce
the nature of the findings below by creating additional
incentives for underinvestment.

(16)1

G'
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xql +, 3(1 - p)x*Q
q1 +18(l-p)Q

Unlike the results for the certainty situation, neither of the first-period decisions takes
the same form as with reversible investment
decisions. Uncertainty affects both firstperiod decisions and does not hinge on the
expected penalty x-. Rather, the choice of
output ql, which will be increased if x decreases and will remain the same if x rises to
x*, is not directly affected by x *, but it is
dependent on x*. The reason for this asymmetry is that the irreversibility constraint will
only be binding if x* is the penalty so that
only in this situation will q1 be the output
level. As indicated by equation (15), the firm
equates the marginal production cost with
the price less the conditional expected costs
associated with low quality, where this expectation is restricted to the states in which
qI is the output level. Equation (7) for the
case of a certain increase in regulatory
stringency is simply a special case of equation (15), where the value of p equals one.
The quality choice z1 also is affected by a
conditional expectation, but here the firm
sets the marginal cost of quality investments
equal to the expected penalties weighted by
the output levels, the probabilities, and the
discount factor. Equation (16) represents a
generalization of equation (12) for the case
of decreasing regulatory stringency. It is not
the expected penalty J- that influences decisions since the only second-period penalty
value that enters is x *. The value of x* is
irrelevant since a tighter penalty will lead the
firm to augment its initial quality investment, so that the first-period quality commitment will no longer be a binding constraint.
With irreversibilities, the focus should not be
on the expected penalties, but on the level of
the regulatory policy in states in which the
irreversibility constraint is binding.
Equations (15) and (16) have unambiguous implications regarding the effect of future regulatory policy lotteries. Consider first
the level of z1 when compared to the revers"'As in the certainty case, I assume that the secondorder conditions are also fulfilled.
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ible case. With myopic quality investments,
the firm equates G' with x, but in the presence of regulatoryuncertainty,the marginal
cost of qualityinvestmentsis equatedto the
expressionon the rightside of equation(16),
which is clearly less than x. If there is any
nonzero probabilitythat the penalty will be
relaxed, firms facing regulatoryuncertainty
will underinvestin quality when compared
with the myopic case.
Uncertainregulatorypolicieswill also lead
to lower values of initial output if the righthand side of equation (15) is below that in
equation(2), a requirementthat reducesto
(17) [Gj+x(l-zj)]+,8p[G2+x'(l-Z)]
> [G + x(l-z)]+ftp[G

+ x(l-z)].-

In the myopic case, the optimalz minimizes
G + x(l - z), so that any effect of uncertainty on the z1 selectedwill raise these quality-related costs in period 1. Except when
1 - p equalszero (see equation(16)), thereis
always a distortionof the choice of z1. The
first bracketedterm on the left-handside of
equation (17) will exceed its counterparton
the right-handside, except when p equals 1,
in whichcase the two termsare equal. From
equation(8) above we know that the second
bracketedtermon the left-handside of equation (17) exceeds the final term on the righthand side except when thereis no chance of
a price increase(i.e., whenp = 0). Uncertain
regulatorypolicies will depress output provided either there is a nonzero chance of a
penalty increase or a nonzero chance of a
penalty decrease.Any nontrivial regulatory
policy lotterywill depressoutput.
Greaterweight on the second-periodoutcomes in which the policy lotteryoccursalso
have an adverseeffect. Increasingthe value
of /3has an unambiguouseffect on q1and zl.
Total differentiationof equations (13) and
(14) producesthe resultthat aql/I8 < 0 and
azI/I/3 < 0, or greaterweightson the period
with uncertain regulatorypolicies will depress both types of investmentin period 1.
Assessing the effects of changes in the
lottery structureare more complicatedsince
there are conflicting influences due to the
complex interrelationshipsbetween q1 and
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The direct effects of p on these variables
are clear cut and, for the remainderof the
paper,I will assumethat these directimpacts
are dominant.'2Equivalently,I will focus on
the effects of q, for fixed values of zl, which
upon differentiationof equation(13) yield

z,.

(18)

dql p[IV- Cl-G2-X*(l
dp

-Z)]

C<0

This expression is negative since, as was
shown in Section III.A, the unit cost of low
is an increasing
quality G(Z)+x*(l-Z)
function of x*. Since the sum of the firstand second-periodterms in equation (13) is
zero, and since these quality-relatedterms
represent the only difference between the
two expressions,increasingq, must have a
negativeeffect on the marginalprofitsresulting in the second period.If this were not the
case, the irreversibilityconstraintwould not
be binding since additionalprofits would be
yieldedby increasingoutputin period2 when
the penaltyrose to x*.
The probabilityp of a penalty increase
also has an unambiguousdirect effect on zl,
for fixed values of ql, since
(19)

dz,I I3Q(-G' + x*)
9p>

dp

ITzIzI

(since G' exceeds x*, see equation (16)).

Increasingthe chance of an increase in the
regulatorypenalty dampens the initial output level and raises the initial qualityinvestment. These results always hold if there is
only one choice variable,or in situationsin
which there are competingeffects, if the direct effects are dominant.

12For example, in the case of dql/dp the value
obtainedwhen effects throughboth choicevariablesare
consideredis negativeexcept for the presenceof a term
jQQ(-G'+ x)(G'- x*) generatedby the indirecteffect
of p on q1 through z1 that is positive since, from
equation (16), we have x > G' > x *. The underinvestment in qualityincreasesthe expectedregulatorypenalties on capacityinvestments,leadingto a possiblereversal in the dqI/dp resultif this effect is large.
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B. The Effect on Profits and the Value
of Information
Since regulatory uncertainty alters enterprise decisions in a manner that is quite
different from what would result if penalties
in each period were equated to their expected
levels, profits will also be affected. If the
regulatory penalty x fully reflects the value
of the quality component to society, the value
of profits will equal the net surplus to society
and can serve as an economic efficiency measure. To analyze the implications for firms'
profitability, let us introduce the notation *
to denote the present value of r obtained
over both periods when the firm selects its
choice variables optimally. The analogous
values in period 2 will be *2(x*) for
second-period profits if x* is the penalty and
2 (x*) after the penalty lottery has resulted
in x*.
The value of * depends on p directly and
through its influence on the choice variables
q,(p) and z,(p), which in turn affects
Q(x *, zl). When differentiating * with re-

spect to p, all terms involving dql/ap and
dz,/dp will drop out (by the envelopetheo-

rem) since the investment levels will be chosen optimally in response to changes in any
parameter such as p. The effect of p on
profits is consequently given by

ad/dp =I [*2(x*) -*2(x*)] < 0,
since profits are lower in the state with a
higher regulatory penalty (i.e., *2(x*) is below *2(x*)). Increasing the chance that the
regulatory penalty will rise reduces the discounted expected profits, as one might expect. The second derivative of the profit
function indicates the curvature of this relationship, where
d2'fi/dp2 =13(dql/dp)[v
-x*(l

-

Z)] +/

-

Cl-G

az' Q(GI

-

x*) >

,

which implies that *(p) is convex.'3
13The direction of this inequality can be easily verified. As noted above, the value of the derivative of
second-period profits with respect to q, is negative since

Discounted
Expected
Profits

"
upT*+ ( -p )

I
Il

lI
l

1
p
O
p of a PenaltyIncrease
Probability
FIGURE 1. THE EFFECTOF REGULATORY
UNCERTAINTYON PROFITS

The function * is sketched in Figure 1.
The two endpoints of the curve are the profits * * with a certain drop in the penalty to
x * and the profits ** with a certain increase
in the penalty. The weighted average of these
points is the dashed line that lies above the *
curve. From Jensen's Inequality, we have the
exceeds *(J-),
result that p* *+(l-p)`**
where these values are indicated on the diagram for one possible value of p, denoted by
p. The firm facing an uncertain regulatory
policy lottery (p, x*; 1- p, x*) will make
lower profits than if it faced the penalty
px * + (I -p) x * with certainty.
A related issue is how the size of this loss
is affected by the value of p. In particular,
what is the expected value of perfect information EVPI regarding the future regulatory
policy or, viewed somewhat differently, what
is the minimal value of the expected opportunity loss that will be incurred? The EVPI
value is simply the gap between the two
curves in Figure 1, or
EVPI = p** *+(1-p)

*- ,*

the irreversibility constraint is binding so the bracketed
term is negative. From equation (16), G' exceeds x*,
and 9z/clp are negative and
and the signs of cq/clp
positive, respectively, assuming the direct effects of p are
dominant.
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The gap will reach its widest amount at
some interiorvalue of p. The effect of p on
EVPI is given by
dEVPI/dp = (X*

-

*)-

aT/dp.

For small values of p, this expression is
positive since the slope of the profit function
vris steeperthan the weightedaveragecurve.
The losses due to uncertaintyare greatest
- T*), which is the
when dar/dp equals (Xir*

slope of the weighted average curve, and
EVPI decreases thereafter.The point s in
Figure 1 represents the p value at which
maximumefficiencylosses occur;s need only
be some interiorpoint and is not necessarily
1/2.
One would expect that a firm's profits
would be decreasingwith respectto p wholly
apart from any losses from uncertaintysince
higherregulatorypenaltiesincreaseits costs.
The more interestingresult is that uncertain
regulatorypolicies impose additionalopportunity losses as firms are discouragedfrom
making irreversible investment commitments. These losses are greatest when the
lottery on regulatorypenalties involves an
intermediatep value ratherthan an extreme
probabilityclose to zero or one.
IV. Conclusion
Three separateeffects of regulatorypolicies on enterprise decisions can be distinguished.First, increasedregulatorypenalties will diminishoutput and profits in static
models or, equivalently,in multiperiodmodels in which investmentsare completely reversible,as is well known. Second, if investment commitmentsareirreversible,therewill
be an additionaleffect of a known schedule
of changes in the regulatorypolicy, which
will depressoutput even further.Finally, the
addition of uncertaintywith regardto regulatorypolicy producesa thirdeffect resulting
in expectedopportunitylosses for firms.Both
output and quality investmentswill be de-
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pressed by regulatorypolicy lotteries.Regulations influencecurrententerprisedecisions
not only through their current level, but
through their expected future level and the
degree of uncertaintyregardingthese future
regulatorypolicies.
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